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Introduction 
On March 18th 1980 President Lopez Portillo announced a 
series of policies designed to benefit small agricultural pro-
ducers in rain-fed areas, and improve the nutritional level of 
almost half the Mexican population. This initiative was not 
completely unexpected, but it did represent a major shift in 
Mexican policy within the sexenio. The Sistema Alimentario Me-
xicano (SAM) is the first serious attempt since 1940 to grapple 
with the twin issues of agricultural development and nutrition in 
Mexico, and seeks to channel a substantial proportion of the 
Government's foreign exchange revenues from oil to the poorest and 
most vulnerable sections of the population. This paper analyses 
the background to the SAM, the evolving crisis in Mexican food 
production, and the forces at work in Mexican society and politics 
which have been brought to bear on the issue. After analysing the 
measures which the President proposed under the SAM (II) and com-
paring these measures with those originally proposed by the policy's 
architects (SAM I), the paper evaluates the policy measures, and 
considers the likelihood that the SAM will be successfully im-
plemented. 
Crisis in the Mexican development model 
Since the 1940s the Mexican development model has been 
credited with achieving exceptionally high rates of growth both in 
industry and agriculture. These results were made possible by 
heavy public expenditure in the irrigated zones, especially the 
North-West, which has absorbed almost three-quarters of government 
investment in agriculture since 1945, and the widespread use of 
the so-called "Green Revolution" high-yielding wheat varieties 
(Hewitt, 1976). Land under cultivation increased between 1945 and 
1955 by over two and a half million hectares, to almost ten 
million hectares, and the sectoral growth rate was more than six 
per cent per annum. During the following decade agricultural 
sector growth dropped slightly to 4.2 per cent per annum, and less 
land was brought into production, but the agricultural sector as 
a whole made impressive strides, earning foreign exchange from 
grain exports, and helping to maintain urban wages and prices 
within politically acceptable limits. Agriculture has contributed 
a surplus to industrialisation, and a balance of payments surplus, 
for agricultural products, of US.783 million dollars in 1979, was 
largely attributable to commercial export crops. The magnitude of 
this contribution explains in part why the development model was 
not abandoned earlier, since it depends for its success on dis-
criminatory prices, foreign exchange rates and low salaries for 
agricultural labourers. 
Presidential politics is sufficiently important in Mexico to 
ensure that few outright opponents of government policy will 
surface, especially in the closing years of a sexenio. However, 
it is worth noting that the interests that support the existing 
development model have been vociferous in maintaining that it 
is in no way at odds with a new orientation towards campesinos 
in rain-fed areas. 
After 1965 it became clear that Mexico would pay the price 
of its agricultural policies, and the achievements of the 1950s 
and early 1960s were dwarfed by the enormity of the problems 
encountered. In- contrast with the earlier periods, when the 
amount of cultivated land increased so greatly, total land 
cultivated declined after 1965. Significantly, the irrigated 
zones continued to show increases in land cultivated (from 2.6 
million hectares to 3.5 million hectares between 1965 and 1976), 
but the rain-fed regions registered a decline of almost two 
million hectares (from 12.15 million hectares in 1965 to 10.6 
million in 1974). Furthermore, the agricultural sector recorded 
a negative rate of growth per capita between 1970 and 1976 as 
population continued to increase rapidly. National production of 
maize failed to keep pace with demand. Although Mexico stood at 
fourth place in terms of maize acreage, she was in nineteenth 
place in the global league of maize producers in terms of yields 
per hectare. The development model which had accorded rain-fed 
agriculture a secondary role entered into a crisis phase when 
the high costs of increasing yields through land extension and 
irrigation were set against diminishing returns. Both the biolo-
gical engineering of the 1950s and 1960s, and the enormous infra-
structural expenditure of the public sector were carried out at the 
cost of neglecting most small producers in rain-fed regions. 
Criticisms of the Mexican Government's policies from the World 
Bank and other agencies were veiled in public, but in private 
were more searching.1 At the same time the pressing need to 
develop agricultural technology for use under ecologically-
precarious growing conditions, which most agricultural scientists 
recognised, appeared to be the only possibility for production 
programs in rain-fed areas. 
The fact that little land was available for irrigation, ex-
cept at unacceptable levels of cost, combined with the opportunities 
which had arisen for increasing production in rain-fed regions, 
provided a new technical context for policy, as Mexico's agri-
cultural crisis worsened. During the 1970s the average annual 
rate of growth of the agricultural sector was just two per cent; 
one per cent behind population growth and only a third of the 
annual increase in Gross National Product in the period. In 
previous decades imports of basic grains had never been more than 
eight per cent of total grain production, but between 1970 and 1979 
imports rose to an average eighteen per cent of production. In 
1972, 1975, 1976 and 1979 the agricultural sector in Mexico ex-
perienced a negative growth rate. The shift away from foodcrops 
is most vividly seen in historical perspective. In 1925 6 million 
hectares of cultivated land had produced 9 million tons of maize, 
wheat and beans for a domestic population of sixteen million. 
Fifty-four years later, in 1979, the cultivated acreage had 
increased to 15 million hectares, but only twice as much was being 
produced (19 million tons) fox four times the population (65 mil-
lion) . Grain imports increased in the late 1970s, and estimates 
for 1980 rose to over 7 million tons. Mexico would be committing 
over one and a half billion US dollars to food imports in 1980. 
Furthermore, the future looked even more unpromising. Cassio 
Luiselli, a Presidential Adviser, and one of the SAM's leading 
proponents, claimed that the Mexican Industrial Development Plan 
foresaw an increase in food imports of 11.6 per cent per annum 
during the 1980s. On this basis Mexico would be spending over 
34 per cent of its foreign exchange from oil on food imports in 
1982, and by 1990 the figure would be 72 per cent.4 The effects 
of the crisis would be felt not only by the rural poor but by 
large sections of the urban middle class and manufacturing industry 
which might have been expected to benefit from Mexico's oil bonanza. 
The SAM I: food power and food security 
Antecedents to the Sistema Alimentario Mexicano (SAM) are 
not difficult to find. CONASUPO, the Government's vast marketing 
and distribution network, had gained in importance under Echevarria 
(Grindle 1977, Esteva 1980). Gustavo Esteva, although less in-
fluential under Lopez Portillo, was Director of CONASUPO under 
Echevarria, and attempted to orientate that organization towards 
the poor campesino's needs (Esteva 1980). He is also Mexico's 
most articulate Neo-Populist thinker (Redclift 1980). Also under 
Echevarria important steps had been taken to develop a research 
capacity in nutrition, led by Adolfo and Miriam Chavez. Adolfo 
Chavez is a leading nutritionist and a scientist of international 
stature. His wife, Miriam, developed some of the early research 
that led up to the SAM, and became an important civil servant in 
the Office of Programming and the Budget. Mexican politics require 
that several alternative policy options are kept on "the back 
boiler" while current initiatives are underway. This is intimate-
ly linked, as Grindle has observed, with the personal careers 
of senior civil servants and politicians during the Presidential 
sexenio (Grindle 1977). The policies announced by President 
Lopez Portillo on March 18, 1980 were based on eight of the 
twenty studies undertaken for the President's Office during the 
years 1976-1980. By March 26, 1979 Cassio Luiselli was able to 
give a fairly full account of this research effort in a paper 
delivered at El Colegio de Mexico. By July 9, 1979, Luiselli 
was devoting almost all his attention to the SAM and agreements 
had already been signed between state agencies and the research 
network that Luiselli was coordinating. 
The SAM mark I is an impressive research document although, 
like many other planning documents in Mexico, it has had very re-
stricted circulation. Much of the research which fed into the 
seven thousand page report from the twenty research committees, 
was underway before the President took an interest in the project. 
The research committees addressed every aspect of food production, 
distribution, marketing and consumption. Research was undertaken 
into synthetic seed varieties and patents, crop storage, the 
operation of guaranteed prices, agribusiness and food manufactu-
ring, diet and nutrition. Luiselli reported, with some justice, 
that this was the first time that research and policy had been 
designed within a systems framework. The relevance of much of 
the research to the impending crisis, and the favour shown it by 
the President himself, attracted many young scientists and 
social scientists to the project. For the first time, it seemed 
to many of them, research was being commissioned or supported 
which might help to provide an alternative to Mexico's increasing 
dependence on imported grains, most of which came from the United 
States, and the large multinational investment in export products 
(crops and livestock) which were destined for the America n mar ket. 
The search for self-sufficiency in foodgrains was also a search 
for greater independence of action in other areas, principally 
energy policy and migration. SAM mark I illustrated once again 
the Mexican state's capacity for cooptation, and the ability of 
the President to confer prestige on any projects which he gives 
personal support to. 
The strategy advocated in the SAM policy studies reflects 
a dependista analysis, similar to that put forward in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but with several important differences. The Left in 
Mexico had long expressed concern about the major role of North 
American capital in manufacturing industry. What was attracting 
much more attention now, however, was the role of US companies 
in Mexican agriculture, especially in export crops like fruit, 
vegetables and strawberries (Rama 1980, Feder 1977). In addition 
agricultural land that was not owned or controlled by multinational 
companies, was increasingly being devoted to cattle raising, es-
pecially in the humid tropics where thousands of campesinos had 
been ejected from their holdings (Rutsch 1980). Directly or in-
directly, and at some cost to domestic food production, Mexico's 
land area appeared to be falling into the hands of multinational 
companies and profiteers. Memories of the role of foreign capital 
during the Porfiriato were evoked by new evidence of heavy 
dependence on North American investment, inputs and food pro-
cessing. 
The reverse side of the same coin showed Mexico as in-
creasingly dependent on grain imports. Luiselli argued that 
"the international market in grains is dominated by the United 
States, which controls eighty-five per cent of the total, through 
four or five multinational companies..."9. The strategic im-
plications of this near monopoly did not elude Mexican attention 
during a year in which the United States had sought to achieve 
foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan by depriving the Soviet 
Union of grain supplies. Food security and food power were 
necessarily interrelated. 
The third element in the new situation was the discovery 
of vast petroleum reserves within Mexican territory. It was no 
coincidence that Lopez Portillo chose the anniversary of the ex-
propriation of foreign oil companies by Cardenas (March 18) to 
signal his new policy. In November 1979 the Mexican Government 
had decided not to renew its agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund. Also in March the President announced that Mexico 
would not join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , 
as had been predicted, and would place an upper limit on oil 
production. On the day that the SAM was announced Lopez Portillo 
decided to opt for a much more nationalistic development strategy 
that looked to the internal market, and the careful management of 
petroleum resources, rather than increased trade with the United 
States, for the economic stimulus required. For some Mexicans 
this shift was seen as an accommodation to interests within Mexico 
but for the Left there was no doubt that it expressed the new-
found ability of the state "to increase its negotiating strength 
with monopoly capital" (Huacuja 1980). It should be recalled that 
by March 1980 Mexico's known reserves of oil placed it fifth in 
the world league (behind Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Soviet Union 
and Iran) and had increased from 6.3 billion barrels in 1975 to 
50 billion barrels. It was estimated that oil revenue in the 
period 1980/83 would be in excess of 39 billion US dollars, 
adding perhaps two more percentage points to the 6.5 per cent 
growth rate achieved in the 1960s (Citibank May 1980). 
SAM II: the measures proposed 
The measures proposed by Lopez Portillo on March 18th 1980 
were based upon eight of the twenty studies which the President's 
Office had commissioned. In themselves these measures were not 
particularly innovative; the state was expected to intervene in 
the market for foodcrops (principally maize, wheat and beans) and 
subsidize both the price the producer received and those which 
the consumer paid. Agricultural credit policy would be enlarged 
and crop insurance extended to the majority of campesinos in rain-
fed areas. It was also proposed to establish agro-industrial 
enterprises under state ownership or control, to ensure that pro-
fits were retained and employment created on Mexican soil. A 
campaign to educate the public about better nutrition would be 
launched on the media. No attempt would be made to hasten the 
redistribution of land, or to control the operations of multi-
national companies working in Mexico. 
The SAM measures represented a radical departure from 
previous policy in one respect alone; the resources made available 
for the programme were on a scale without precedent. By December 
1980 official bank credit to agriculture topped $US 3 billion, 
forty-six per cent more than in 1979 (Politica December 19, 1980). 
Another $US 5 billion was to be allocated to agricultural in-
vestment by both the public and private sector, and crop insurance. 
Even the budget of the once prestigious PIDER programme, which had 
brought infrastructure to hundreds of Mexican 'micro-regions', 
stood at only $US 180,000,000 in 1980. Superficially, at least, 
Luiselli seemed justified in asserting that the SAM marked the 
state's intention to "retake the central role of accumulation in 
the countryside". 
The SAM measures leave one in little doubt that it was con-
ceived as a subsidy policy. Indeed, Lopez Portillo is reported 
to have said that under the SAM subsidies would reach "monstrous 
proportions" (Analisis Politico 9.4.80). The guaranteed price 
for maize would be increased by 30 per cent between 1980 and 
1982. In addition to this the consumer price of a range of basic 
foods would be subsidised by 70 per cent, enabling poor people to 
buy a minimum basket of goods worth thirteen pesos (26 pence) for 
only nine pesos. The idea of the canasta basica, with its echoes 
of Chilean policy under Unidad Popular, received widespread support 
in the Press. The producer was also to receive further subsidies: 
fertilisers would be 30 per cent cheaper, and improved seed 
varieties up to 75 per cent cheaper. The specific objective was 
to double the area of cultivated land on which fertilisers were 
used by 1982. The global objective was self-sufficiency in maize 
and beans by 1982 and in wheat, sunflower seed oil and rice 
by 1985. 
These measures were introduced against a depressing back-
ground. In 1980 only two-fifths of the 24,410 ejidos in Mexico 
received credit from official sources, such as the state credit 
bank, BANRURAL. Of the campesinos who did receive credit the 
majority were ejidatarios, rather than independent producers, 
and most of them worked irrigated land. Thus 29 per cent of the 
cultivated land was worked by producers who had access to official 
credit. The proportion of government and private credit allocated 
to agriculture declined from about 17 per cent in 1945 to under 10 
per cent in 1979, and the bulk of this was destined for commercial 
farmers. Clearly there was "in basic campesino production...a 
space that (could) be occupied". 
Another facet of the SAM was given considerable emphasis 
by the project's architects. Crop insurance was to be extended 
and the risks of production losses carried by the government as 
well as the producer. For the first time the state agency res-
ponsible for crop insurance (ANAGSA) was to insure the campesino 
for the value of the labour he invested in production. Even when 
sowing was made impossible for climatic reasons, or seeds did not 
germinate, the small producer would be protected. If crops failed 
the campesino would be assured of receiving payment for the 
average harvest. The "shared risk fund" (Fondo de Riesgo Compar-
tido) was said to be a tangible example of what the government 
meant by its proclaimed goal of "creating an alliance between the 
state and the campesino". 
The research committees concerned with nutrition were among 
the most searching and provocative of those established. Nutri-
tional research in Mexico had for long been neglected, despite 
the contribution of individual scientists like Joaquin Cravioto 
and Adolfo Chavez. A National Nutrition Survey had been carried 
out of 21,000 households and a great deal of case study material 
had been amassed. The SAM explicitly set nutritional goals, and 
proposed a range of measures to ensure that they were met. The 
"target population" was made up of the 19 million Mexicans whose 
daily calorie and protein intake was below the accepted minimum 
required for physical wellbeing (2,750 calories and 80 grammes 
of protein daily). The basket of foodstuffs at a reduced price 
would need a subsidy of over 27 billion pesos (£500,000,000) to 
put it within reach of the target population. CONASUPO, which 
would be responsible for much of the food distribution, would have 
its retail outlets increased from 4,780 to 14,000. It is worth 
remarking that before the SAM measures were introduced CONASUPO 
had lost the favoured position it had gained under Echevarria, 
and had suffered several major budgetary setbacks. The surveys 
undertaken by the National Nutrition Institute revealed that 
severe malnutrition was so common in the school-age population 
of populous states such as Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Yucatan, 
that over 25 million Mexicans never ate meat and that less than 
30 million drank milk regularly. Prior to the President's speech 
giving full support to the SAM, the Mexican Press was full of 
reports of malnutrition in rural areas, and the role played in 
this situation by foreign agribusiness interests. Not surprising-
ly, the nutritional interventions proposed in the SAM have attract-
e d widespread support although, as we shall see, the measures 
proposed may have raised false hopes of overcoming what was 
essentially a structural problem. 
Taking sides: Left, Right and Centre 
Given the degree of Presidential support for the SAM it 
is not surprising that most criticism has been muted, especially 
that of functionaries in government offices. It was expected 
that the Confederacion de Camaras Industriales (CONCAMIN), 
which supported Mexico joining the GATT, would be most critical 
of the S A M . H However most private sector organizations have 
given at least token support to the Presidential announcement of 
March 18. Meeting in Mexico City immediately after the policy 
changes were announced, the Quadripartite Commission, representing 
executives from both United States and Mexican business, offered 
"the assistance of the Mexican and private sectors in the 
implementation of the new programme". Indeed, members of the 
Commission evidently saw the SAM as opening the door for more, 
rather than less, bilateral investment opportunities. Luiselli 
had already announced in several interviews that the SAM was 
not a threat to multinational capital in Mexican agriculture, 
since foodcrop production was not a profitable area for multi-
national investment.13 This view was not shared by some multi-
national companies. It was certainly at variance with the analysis 
in SAM mark I, which viewed multinational involvement in agri-
culture as a threat to effective foodcrop production in rain-fed 
areas. 
In May 1980 it was announced that a group of forty-five 
companies had agreed to make food-related investments in Mexico 
totalling over 77 million US dollars. To assist the firms in-
volved, the federal government granted participating companies 
a 20 per cent tax credit on their investments.15 In accordance 
with the National Industrial Development Plan these investments 
were expected to provide employment in food manufacturing and 
distribution, as well as in agriculture. The Mexican state, 
instead of penalising multinational investment in agriculture, 
appeared to be negotiating with multinational capital. Several 
commentators suggested that foodcrop production might not prove 
quite as unattractive to international capital as Luiselli had 
indicated. Increasing the guaranteed price for maize, while 
freezing that for sorghum, could provide an incentive for the 
commercial sector to convert land to maize production. This 
policy had been advocated within the Cabinet by Toledo Corro 
and Merino Rabago, representing the Agrarian Reform and Agri-
culture Ministries. 
If the SAM appeared to leave the door open to the multi-
nationals its provisions were equally ambiguous in another 
critical policy area, that of livestock raising. Much of the 
Mexican humid tropics had become a battleground for the competing 
interests of campesinos and ganaderos. Livestock had assumed much 
more importance during the 1970s, and exports of beef on the hoof, 
as well as beef for the high-income domestic market, had attracted 
foreign capital to livestock raising. In many parts of the humid 
tropics, such as Chiapas, Tamaulipas and Veracruz, ganaderos had 
waited for campesinos to clear the land before ejecting them. 
Conflict in the tropical, livestock producing areas of Mexico 
often involved disputes over recent land claims, capital exhibited 
expansionist tendencies and extensive grazing land was taken by 
force or by dubious legal methods. Cattlemen argued that unless 
they were given protection against peasant land claims, they could 
not be relied upon to modernize their holdings and increase 
investment in them. 
The action that was taken against ganadero interests was 
largely cosmetic, and it soon became clear that contrary to the 
analysis of the original SAM committees cattle ranchers would 
be free to interpret the law as they wished. In Tamaulipas of 
the 505,000 hectares of land "expropriated" from 136 ganaderos 
in the region, less than a third of the land area (165,000 
hectares) was allocated to the landless. The rest was covered 
by amparos which foreclosed the possibility of legal transfer 
for an indefinite p e r i o d . ^ While the SAM measures were being 
announced, in Chiapas cattlemen who dedicated 20 per cent of 
their land area to crop production were given immunity from 
expropriation. This action drew comment in the Press, as accord-
i n g to the Mexican Constitution, only land which was unsuitable 
for crop production could be devoted to cattle raising. Toledo 
Corro, the Agrarian Reform Minister at the time, had apparently 
acted unconstitutionally in extending to the cattlemen rights 
that they did not have under the law! 
The government's inability, or unwillingness, to implement 
those parts of the SAM philosophy which hit at private commercial 
interests, did not recommend it to the organized Left in Mexico. 
CIOAC, the major independent peasant federation, condemned the 
SAM as an imperialist policy' , while the Movimiento Nacional 
Plan de Ayala, another independent rural union, claimed that the 
SAM would "provide more protection and facilitate the enrichment 
of latifundists and m u l t i n a t i o n a l s " . ^ Left intellectuals noted 
that "the SAM has the support of those who, supposedly, are its 
enemies, and that support is not gratuitous..." (Huacuja 1980). 
Even Luiselli admitted that "for political reasons" over 3 million 
hectares of land, mainly in tlie humid tropics, had been excluded 
from the SAM's territorial jurisaiction. 
The SAM's principal support came from those within the 
government structure who had been pressing for a Leftward, more 
nationalist policy for some time. The petroleum workers1 union 
(STPRM, the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica 
Mexicana) lent most public support and finance to the project. 
The STPRM has assets worth over 88 million US dollars, acquired 
through its compulsory savings scheme. These funds are invested 
in land, agricultural cooperatives, social services and small 
industry. After the announcement of the SAM the union committed 
22 million dollars to help finance the policy, on the under-
standing that PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, matched this 
investment with a similar amount. 
The voluble support of STPRM and the powerful official trade 
union organization, the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos 
(CTM), was vital to the Presidential Advisers in charge of setting 
up the machinery to implement the SAM. Not all the government 
agencies responsible for implementing the different facets of the 
SAM were convinced of its value. Interviews conducted with senior 
civil servants and technocrats in these agencies suggest that 
Presidential support, although a necessary element in policy 
formulation, is not a sufficient one. Rivalry between organiza-
tions Such as the DIF (Desarrollo Integral de la Familia) and the 
IMSS (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social) in the areas of 
health and nutrition, is paralleled by that between CONASUPO and 
PIDER, both of which are involved in the provision of rural 
services. The SAM was a "top-down" policy that did not have its 
roots in the state agencies that would be called on to do the im-
plementation. These agencies were conceived as active partners 
in the policy, but they had not formulated it themselves, and con-
siderable resistance was mounted to policies originating outside 
the agencies. The most politically volatile of them, such as 
the Rural Credit Bank (BANRURAL) had long experience of using 
delaying tactics with policies which did not get their full 
support. Nevertheless the SAM measures clearly gave a boost to 
some government agencies which were given priority under the 
programme. Between 1976 and 1980, for example, CONASUPO had 
largely abandoned its earlier interest in helping small producers 
in favour of a provisioning role for the food industries and an 
increased role in the management of food imports. Under the SAM 
it assumed a much more central role. 
Press comment on the SAM became more critical within the 
space of a month. Headlines such as "The SAM - from Myth to 
Legend", and "The Paper Food System", called attention to the 
difficulties experienced in coordinating the many agencies in-
volved, doubts about whether the "ammonia pipeline" to the cen-
tral rain-fed areas of the country from the Gulf oilwells would 
ever be completed, and the inevitable bureaucratic delays. The 
apparent support being given the project by the multinational com-
panies and ganaderos brought the observation that "we are all 
samistas now"! The SAM was initially expected to set the 
President on a collision course with three groups: the multi-
national companies, the ganaderos and the local caciques. As 
we have seen the first two groups were easily accommodated to 
the SAM. The response of the third group is more difficult to 
assess. However, on LuiselliTs admission, the SAM's success 
rested on its capacity to incorporate approximately 370,000 small 
retail outlets throughout the country. These small traders pro-
vided the campesinos with much of the credit they received, es-
pecially in areas poorly served by CONASUPO. They were rivals of 
CONASUPO, and the traditional breeding-ground of the cacique. 
Evaluating SAM 
Anybody living in Mexico City during the first six months 
of 1980 could be excused for thinking that the fortunes of PEMEX 
and the SAM were the only issues of any importance to the country. 
As we have seen, however, Mexican government policy is formulated 
in a rather more ambiguous way. Different Presidential Advisers 
are sometimes responsible for closely related public policy areas, 
and frequently reach different conclusions. While the SAM was 
being endorsed officially, the Presidents senior Adviser, Jose 
Antonio Ugarte, was preparing a much more orthodox agricultural 
policy. The discussion of the 'Agricultural Production Law* had 
received attention before the SAM was launched. The proposed law 
would enable private capital to penetrate the ejido with more 
ease, and even included provision for relaxing the official res-
trictions on renting out ejido land. The announcement that 
such measures were being contemplated created a furore, and the 
plans were scotched. However, by September 1980 new reports emer-
ged that the 'Agricultural Production Law' was being reconsidered. 
Had the SAM lost its momentum or even been abandoned? Clearly 
the President was keeping other policy options open should the 
SAM fail to bring about the anticipated increases in agricultural 
production. 
There can be little doubt that the SAM was conceived as a 
production programme, designed to lift rain-fed agriculture out 
of a deep depression. No attempt was made to distinguish between 
strata of rural producers nor was the policy proposed redistri-
butive except in sectoral terms. Improved producer prices and 
incentives to adopt new technology through improving credit and 
crop insurance facilities were of little use to the marginal 
campesino working under ecologically-precarious conditions. As 
Wellhausen has argued, the majority of Mexican campesinos belong 
to this vulnerable group, for whom the only hope lies in develop-
ing "farming systems" research which reduces risks, rather than 
heavy reliance on fertilisers and synthetic seed varieties (Well-
hausen 1976). For most the only alternative open is probably 
migration. Three-quarters of the Mexicans working in the United 
States come from the northern semi-arid states, according to a 
recent Mexican government survey.19 
To some extent the SAM's call for government controlled agro-
industry was an attempt to accommodate to the reality of the 
Mexican countryside, where underemployment is endemic and both 
seasonal and long-term migration are well established. Pre-
sumably the agro-industrial enterprises could be expected to 
"mop-up" the rural wage workers, seasonal and permanent. Rural 
proletarians, like UNAM intellectuals, might be expected to have 
incipiently collectivist leanings. State management of agro-
industry also appealed to many technocrats in larger government 
agencies like CONASUPO, SARH (Ministry of Agriculture) and PIDER 
(the Integrated Rural Development Programme). This was a con-
stellation of interests that Echevarria had managed to accommodate 
in 1975 and 1976. Like most Mexican alignments it had survived 
one sexenio only to reappear in another. According to this 
interpretation the SAM was "the fullest expression of authoritarian 
paternalism".20 
There is another explanation, however, that is less straight-
forward. This is that the SAM was never looked upon by Lopez 
Portillo as a major attempt at resource redistribution. A more 
nationalistic policy, designed to stimulate the internal market, 
could be expected to find support on the Left if it appeared to 
favour the campesino. It could be useful to exaggerate the SAM's 
radicalism. Certainly many of the younger researchers and 
bureaucrats involved with the SAM expressed the view that subject-
ing the policy to criticism might provoke the feared Right-wing 
backlash. These sentiments are well understood by Mexican Presi-
dents, who have often proved adept at manipulating them for their 
own ends. According to this interpretation most of the ideologi-
cal associations of the SAM, including attacks on the multinationals 
and cattlemen, and calls for an alliance between the state and campe-
sino, were nothing more than politically expedient. The SAM represented 
an attempt to produce and channel a larger surplus from those 
campesinos in rain-fed areas who were capable of delivering it, 
and from those commercial producers in the irrigated regions who 
could be persuaded to convert their land to maize production. At 
the end of a sexenio such policies could help reassemble the 
various interests lending support to the PRI and the Presidency. 
The pack of cards could then be dealt out again by the incoming 
President. Naturally, other interpretations can be offered for 
the undoubted ability of Mexican Presidents, at almost any stage 
in the sexenio, to face two ways at once. 
Future outcomes 
It is too early to say what will happen to the SAM. Some 
would say that it is already too late in the sexenio for anything 
to happen. Critics will point to the inability of most Mexican 
government agencies to implement a policy which rests on gaining 
the confidence of the campesino. Organizations like BANRURAL and 
CONASUPO, guilty of acting like caciques, are scarcely adequate to 
the task of eliminating caciquismo from rural areas. The develop-
ment of a rural strategy that was pro-campesino, if not actually 
campesinista, would involve the Mexican government in a greater 
commitment to a number of areas: primary health care as well as 
nutrition, farming systems research linked to improved extension 
services, rural education schemes for adults as well as children, 
like that pioneered by CONAFE. If future Presidents wish to take 
this road there are two important factors on which they can 
count. First, there is seventy years of tradition and experience 
in campesino organization, much of it frustrating, but some of it 
clearly of value in designing alternative rural development 
strategy. Second, there is the prospect, in the foreseeable future, 
of continuing revenue from oil. 
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